International Law have asked how states stay in compliance or choose to defect in international agreements (Duruigbo, 2001; Henkin 1979, Chayes and Chayes, 1993). Many International Relations research has also been applied to the WTO (Keohane, 1984; Ruggie, 1982; Kratochwill and Ruggie, 1986). However, most of the research has its concentration on dispute settlement mechanisms or the context of International Law as a whole, but none of them is using TPRM (Trade Policy Review Mechanism) as a specific object of study.
Introduction
The first school of thought is taken from the perspective of Realism. Taking its classical form in the promise-making mechanism, Realism thrives on the Machiavellian principle on "rational-actor conception of compliance" (Chayes & Chayes, 1998) . As a big believer of self-reliance and self-interest in relative gains, this theory emphasizes that compliance will only happen if the bargain is in line with the state interest.
The second explanation, Regime Theory, takes Realism's explanation into concern when its basic assumptions start to fall. Regime Theory believes the Realism explanation as flawed when there are regimes that are successful in maintaining multilateral agreement without a horrifying, significant
punishment. An International institution that works mainly in economic concerns, such as GATT, WTO, IMF or World Bank, up until today is still considered by regime theory as significant and able to enforce the main part of its envision to its members. Regime theory is defined as a set of principles, norms, rules and decision-making procedures, which are explicitly or implicitly applied, that are publicly known and affecting the state's behavior (James reputation and teaching reciprocity between states. Today, Regime theory is metamorphosed into neoliberal institutionalism, which is a more general rubric (Duruigbo, 2001) . Keohane (1989) perceived that institution is including a far broader scope than that of regimes and says that it incorporates almost every interaction, rules, which prescribe expectation, identity, and belief of a state. In here, Keohane (1989) diverge institutions in three categories: (1) Formal or cross-national nongovernmental organizations -such as WTO.
(2) Regimes, defined as (1) instances of compliance with international law and (2) instances of violation. Guzman (2002) draws his theory based on several assumptions:
(1) International Law affects states'
behavior to the extent that it impacts countries' incentives, different from the traditionalist definition, in which it affects behavior with the fact that the law is not always followed.
(2) States are independence and self reliance.
(3) The domestic legal institution plays an important role in a state's compliance with International Law.
(4) It is relevant only in a repeated interaction model.
In his theory, Guzman (2002) argues that countries would be more likely to comply if they consider two factors, reputation, and retaliation (sanctions).
First, reputation affects states in a long game in which it will affect how future treaties will be made. It assumes that a country will be more likely to agree with a country that has a good reputation, in which the cost of maintaining a reputation is lower than defection. (Guzman, 2002) .
Using this assumption, the study is considered the framework will help answer how WTO as a regime affects Indonesia's compliance in TPRM. It will examine the requirements of a regime to ensure the highest probability of compliance and will explain the motivation of compliance, or defection, which concentrated on the ability of the WTO to create an impact on reputation and substantial damage in every defection.
TPRM (Review on Government's Trade

Policy)
Regime theory has various mechanisms in approaching compliance in a regime. Among them is a reporting mechanism. Reporting mechanism has been seen as one way of improving the treaty's effectiveness and at the In the bigger picture, TPRM is a very simple agreement. First, countries promise to make a report every certain period of time depends on their share in global trade. Second, the secretariat will respond, also with a report, but more detailed and comprehensive, to be stored in the WTO's trade policy archive.
Third, if a country wants to make a significant change in its trade policy, it is obliged to notify the TPRB (Trade Policy Review Body).
The detailed version, step-by-step mechanism of TPRM is divided into five major parts. The review process will be initiated with a date set for the review meeting of the TPRB.
Setting the date is important to make the schedule for the next step. After the time is set, the TPRB usually will put the other four steps in the deadline required, given adequate time to finish the components of the review. The
Secretariat might also visit the country directly to introduce TPRM or to gather data, especially in the least-developed countries or developing countries that need special assistance.
In the second step, the Secretariat will send a request on the components. Member countries then will have four to six weeks to gather all the information needed for the TPRM,
including official publication or any other media to ensure the accuracy of the review.
The Secretariat will then make the first draft of the report on the third step. The report will be sent to the national authorities of the member under review for verification and comments. The report and the policy statement by the member under review will be distributed for five weeks before the meeting.
The fourth step is a visit to the capital.
Secretariat will make a specific team visit the member under review for a week to ten days.
During this visit, the Secretariat will have
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The fifth step is the meeting of the TPRB. In this meeting, other members will submit questions to be answered by the member under review at least two weeks before the first session of the review meeting -it usually consists of two sessions, each for half a day, and the representative of the member under review will answer at the start of the first session.
The report will then complete and ready for publication.
Mainly, it will receive reports, make reports and store reports. Wider economic and developmental needs, external environment") and contain a detailed list of issues and subjects to be addressed (Wolfrum, Stoll & Kaiser, 2006) . Some people may think that it is ridiculous for a country to break its reputation for a mere report. But if there is nothing on the table rather than an immaterial reputation, it might be a little bit more complicated than that.
Before we jump into the theoretical approach and cases, we need to ask why Revision of the format is made by the TPRB process, but the legal text does not put any measurement for a necessary condition to happen, and vaguely state the revision will be based on experience.
Compliance and International Law
In 2005 Answering this claim, Guzman (2008) made a theory on compliance that works based on three aspects, infamously known as the Three Rs of Compliance: Reputation, Reciprocity, and Retaliation. He claimed that his theory came from institutionalism in a repeated-game model of national behaviour and believes that this theory will prove that international law does affect the behavior of the state (Guzman, 2002) . Mentioned also in his essay, Reputation and International Law, that previous Goldsmith and Posner (2005) book ignores completely the role of reputation (Guzman, 2005) .
Applying Theory of Compliance on
Indonesia and TPRM
Before applying Guzman theory to TPRM and Indonesia, this study will break upon the necessity of applying this theory upon the WTO's TPRM. First, the study will analyze the actors and model of the game. Guzman (Guzman, 2002) .
When Indonesia is entering the WTO, it sets the declaration of compliance regarding six treaties, in which one of them is TPRM.
Based on their share of the world trade, the treaty requires Indonesia to report for every four years. In the explanation above, members are required to make a "full report", and required to "describe the trade policies and practices pursued by the Member or Members concerned" (Wolfrum, Stoll, & Kaiser, 2006) .
For this report is finalized in a time period, the interaction is limited between the WTO and the states to make the report. However, in After reassuring that the theory applies to the circumstances, we need to understand the assumptions and the logic of the theory. Guzman (2002) believes that compliance theory must explain both compliance and violations of international law. When the reputational effect may alter countries'
incentive to make its decision, it does not automatically lead them to compliance if there is no enforcement mechanism in the form of immediate sanction that can balance the payoff to the equilibrium. As an example, a country might violate a trade law regarding the export tax if the pay-off that can be generated from that policy is overpowering the sanction.
However, if the sanction is in the form of, as an example, embargo, the country will suffer more than what it gets from the violation. Guzman (2002) argues that only in this condition, with the addition of a strong enforcing mechanism, compliance will be achieved completely. Since the construction of TPRM as a regime is not essentially expected their members to comply fully, or loose in terms of compliance, the reputational value in the TPRM alone is low -even close to nonexistent. Secondly, TPRM needs a broader scope under its supervision. The proceeding published by the TPRB today is very easy to read and intended for the public that needs a better understanding of their country or other countries' performance. Nevertheless, it is in the form of a report-list that is usually too concise. People or government officials may find reports in the TPRM proceeding, but don't know why it could be considered need revising or need to be continued in the future.
The third is the cross funding from developed to the least developed country. If it can be in the form of money, the developed country could lend their human resources by sending staff to the least developed country. (Chayes, Chayes, 1998) . The staff will help another sovereign country in making reports or guiding them to the understanding of the WTO.
Conclusion
Reporting on compliance, enforcement, and other activities to international regulatory is often described as essential to meet the goal of the regulatory body (Mitchell, 1994) . In the case of compliance and WTO, TPRM plays like the heart of its reporting mechanism. TPRM is obliged to make a substantial report based on the government statement, notification and various legal documents of a member under review.
The review process will be done under the supervision of TPRB together with WTO members' representatives. At the end of the review process, TPRM will publish two proceedings. One is for the government policy statement and the other one is a comprehensive In Indonesia, the TPRM mentioned import monopolies, licensing requirements and export restrictions on agricultural products that were removed in the 1998 economic reform.
But these reforms done in the agriculture sector were motivated by economic necessity, rather than the TPRM as the surveillance instrument.
By seeing that many restrictions are still alive in the agriculture sector today, TPRM is empirically proven not to be able to influence the state's decision-making process. This underscores the point that states are unlikely to perform their treaty obligations when the capacity to do so is nonexistent (Chayes, Chayes, 1998 
